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GREAT ARMENIA AND EUPHRATES FRONTIER IN 60–S A.D. (CONFLICT, IDEAS, SETTLEMENT)

Introduction

For centuries, the Euphrates River made up the border between Rome and the East – Iran, India, and China. The process of exchanging the values of culture and civilization took place across that border. It concerned economics and technologies, trade and military art, esthetics and religion. The two worlds interacted through local civilizations – Nabatea, Syria, North Mesopotamia, and Asia Minor. They were called to intensify this global process¹. In our opinion, Great Armenia should also be mentioned among them.

This paper deals with the aspect of the problem which focuses on historiography and military art. The temporal frame of discussion is the 50–60s, the reign of Nero in Rome, and Vologeses I in Parthia. The scene is North Mesopotamia and (particularly) Great Armenia. As to the content of the interchange, it represents the so-called Ten Years War (54–64) for domination over the region. Those events are well attested by the primary sources – particularly by Tacitus, Dion Cassius, and Suetonius. There are numerous scrupulous studies on different aspects of the problem².

As for us, we see our task in outlining and interpreting the main events of

¹ **V. Chapot**, *La frontier de l'Euphrate, de Pompée à la conquête arabe*, Paris, Ancien Libr. Thorin et Fils, 1907, pp. 3–38; **J. J. Miller**, *The Spice Trade of the Roman Empire*, Oxford, Oxford Univ. Press, 1965, pp. 34–109; **A. H. M. Jones**, *Asian Trade in Antiquity*, in *The Roman Economy. Studies in Ancient Economic and Administrative History* (ed. by P. A. Brunt), Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1974, pp. 140–150; **W. Ball**, *Rome in the East, The Transformation of an Empire*, London/New York, Routledge, 2002, pp. 129–138; **P. M. Edwell**, *Rome and Persia, The Middle Euphrates, Mesopotamia, and Palmira under Roman Control*, New York, Routledge, 2008, pp. 7–30; **F. Stark**, *Rome on the Euphrates, The Story of a Frontier*, New York, Tauris Parke Paperbacks, 2012, pp. 160–188.

² **B. W. Henderson**, *The Life and Principate of the Emperor Nero*, London, Metuen, 1903, pp. 151–196; **W. Schur**, *Die Orientpolitik des Kaisers Nero*, *Klio*, 15 (1923), S. 7–38; **W. Schur**, *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der Kriege Corbulos*, 19 (1925), S. 75–96; **M. Hammond**, *Corbulo and Nero's Eastern Policy*, *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*, 45 (1934), 81–104; **N. Debevoise**, *A Political History of Parthia* (2 d ed.), New York, Greenwood Press, 1968, pp. 179–202; **M.-L. Chaumont**, *L'Arménie entre Rome et l'Iran. De l'avènement d'Auguste à l'avènement de Dioclétien*, in *ANRW*, T. II, Bd. 2/1 (1974), pp. 101–123; **G. A. Koshelenko**, **V. V. Pilipko**, *Parthia*, in *History of Civilizations of Central Asia*, v. II, *The Development of Sedentary and Nomadic Civilizations: 700 B.C. to A.D. 250* (ed. J. Harmatta et al.), Paris, UNESCO Publ., 1996, pp. 134–135; **M. Heil**, *Die orientalische Aussenpolitik des Kaisers Nero*, München, Tuduv Vrlg., 1997, S. 11–140.

the time in the light of parallels with the early military experience of the Romans. We mean the Second Samnite War (326–304 B.C.). That war showed obvious parallels with the Ten Years War. The Romans realized this fact juxtaposing the texts of Livius and Tacitus. And we are going to test the same approach in the governing circle of the Parthians as well. More exactly, in the close entourage of the King of Kings, there were intellectuals well acquainted with the main events of Roman history. They tried to make this knowledge basic for decision-making activity.

It must be taken into consideration that groups of Hellenistic intellectuals lived and worked in Parthia and Great Armenia. They were attested from the II–I centuries B.C. In Parthia, they were headed by Apollodorus of Artemita who authorized “Parthica” and other works of historical and geographical character [Strabo, II, 5, 12]¹. In Great Armenia, the philosopher Metrodorus of Scepsis and orator Amphicrates of Athens were eminent among the Greek who found refuge at the court of Tigranes II. It is well known, Metrodorus had compiled a treatise “On Tigranes”. It seems, under his influence Artavazd II composed his numerous plays, orations and stories [Plut., Crass., XXXIII, 23].

Historical background

From 37 to 52, Rome retained control over Great Armenia by the hands of the nominees of the Georgian royal house – Mitridate and Rhadamistus². They might have belonged to the extinct Armenian Artaxiad dynasty through the maternal lineage³. The Armenian nobility was not satisfied with that situation and looked for a chance to change it. The chance offered itself at the beginning of the 50s when Vologeses I (51–79) was enthroned in Parthia. He decided to put an end to the domestic strife and restore the former security of his Empire. For this purpose he planned to change the essentials of domestic and foreign policy of Parthia⁴. With a view to this end, he planned to set up a defense league against Rome under his own leadership. Besides Parthia, it would comprise the key countries of the region, Atropatene, Great Armenia, Adiabene, and (presumably) Albania. The Transeuphratean league was planned to have its council where every participant had “an equal voice” in decision-making procedure⁵. The Armenian nobility was informed about these radical plans and

¹ V. Nikonorov, Apollodorus of Artemita and the Date of his Parthica Revised, *Electrum*, 2 (1998), p. 107–108.

² Ch. Wendt, *Die Entwicklung der römischen Auserpolitik von der Späten Republik bis den Frühen Prinzipat*, Berlin, Verlag Antike, 2008, S. 241.

³ C. Toumanoff, *Studies in Christian Caucasian History*, Georgetown, Georgetown Univ. Press, 1963, pp. 81, n. 103.

⁴ J. Neusner, *Parthian Political Ideology*, *Iranica Antica*, 3 (1963), pp. 52–57; K. Farrokh, *Shadows in the Desert: Ancient Persia at War*, Oxford/New York, Osprey Publishing House, 2007, p. 145.

⁵ A. Stépanian, *Le traite de Rhandée et le couronnement de Tiridate l’Arsacide à Rome*, *Revue des études arméniennes*, 9 (1975/1976), pp. 205–207. From this point of view, Tacitus’ account about one of the sessions of the Council of the League must be assessed typical [Tacit., Ann., XV, 1–2]. During the Council, Vologeses was criticized by the king of Adiabene Monobazus for his inactivity. King’s brother Tiridates summed up the resentment: “Great empires were not conserved by inaction – they need the conflict of men and armies” [Ann., XV, 1].

initiated contacts with the Parthian court. Soon, the sides came to terms¹. According to them, a new kind of relations had to be established between the two countries. And the Armenian throne had to be secured for the younger brother of the King of Kings, the prince Tiridates. Bringing about this agreement, the Parthian troops entered Armenia and exiled Radamistus with the support of the Armenians. In 54 A.D., Tiridates Arsacid was proclaimed the new king of Great Armenia [Tacit., Ann., XII, 50; cf. Jos. Flav., Ant. Jud., XX, 3, 4].

Nero's regime showed its preparedness to start military actions [Tacit., Ann., XIII, 7]. One of the eminent generals of the time Gn. D. Corbulo was sent to the West as legate of Galatia and Cappadocia². However, it did not lead to war. In 55 A.D., the sides came to truce. Apparently, the intimate advisers of the emperor S. A. Burrus and L. A. Seneca were not certain of victory³. In accordance with the truce, Tiridates released the hostages and renewed friendship with the Romans which "[...] meant to pave the way to further kindness (beneficiis locum aperiret)" [Tacit., Ann., XIII, 37]⁴.

Meanwhile Corbulo carried on the training of his legions. The Romans kept an eye on the processes in Parthia. Moreover, they entered into contacts with the opposition factions⁵. And soon the fragile balance was broken: Vologeses I was again involved into the home strife and was not able to support Tiridates. Taking this advantage, Nero's regime decided to come back to the way of military activity. In 58 A.D., a Roman army invaded Armenia under Gn. D. Corbulo. The act was supported by the Roman allies – king Antiochus of Commagene, Pharasmanes of Iberia, the Moschi tribesmen – who raided the outlying regions of Great Armenia. Naturally, Tiridates could not defend his kingdom with limited forces⁶. He tried to end the conflict in talks. Through a legation he spoke in the name of the Arsacid house reminding of their valor and victories over the Romans. In reply, Corbulo advised him to turn to Nero with a petition and emphasized: "A stable throne and a bloodless reign might fall to his lot, if he would renounce a dim and distant hope in order to pursue one which was within his grasp and preferable" [Tacit., Ann., XIII, 37]. The essence of this rather obscure reply (si omissa spe longinqua et sera praesentem potioremqe sequeretur) was, most probably, a proposal to Tiridates to stop his membership

¹ J. Malitz, Nero, Malden/Oxford, Blackwell, 2005, p. 58.

² R. Syme, Domotius Corbulo, The Journal of Roman Studies, 60 (1970), pp. 38–39.

³ Ch. Wendt, op. cit., S. 242; B. Campbell, War and Society in Imperial Rome 31 B.C. to A.D. 284, London/New York, Routledge, 2002, p. 10.

⁴ For more detailed survey of this settlement of the Armenian problem see O. V. Kudriavtsev, Eastern Policy of Roman Empire at the Beginning of Nero's Reign, Vestnik drevnej istorii, 1 (1950), pp. 83–95 (in Russ.). The author promoted an original approach to the confrontation of Rome and Parthia in Armenia: each of the rivals tended not so much to occupy Armenia, as not let the other to do that.

⁵ More active were the Hyrcanians, who "[...] had sent to the Roman emperor, soliciting an alliance and pointing as a pledge of friendliness, to their detention of Velogeses" [Tacit., Ann., XIV, 25, 2]. Apparently, the Hyrcans found support from the powerful Kushāns who had already laid the foundations of their empire. See M. Heil, op. cit., S. 86–88; A. D. H. Bivar, The Political History of Iran under the Arsacids, in Cambridge History of Iran, v. 3/1, 2006, p. 82.

⁶ R. Alston, Aspects of Roman History, A.D. 14–117, London/New York, Routledge, 1998, pp. 125–129; A. Goldsworthy, Corbulo and Armenia, in In the Name of Rome. The Men Who Won the Roman Empire, London, Phoenix, 2004, pp. 313–316.

in the Tanseuphratean league and become a Roman client king¹. The Roman side, perhaps, took into account his popularity in Armenia.

Tiridares did not accept the condition and was forced to flee. As to Corbulo, he captured the capital of Great Armenia, Artaxata, looted and destroyed it. He chose Tigranocerta as the new capital and raised Tigranes, a prince of the Cappadocian descent, to the Armenian throne². Probably, he was also an Ar-taxiad by the maternal lineage³.

Soon, Corbulo left Armenia for Syria to perform his new duties of the governor of the province. Obviously, he realized that the conflict had not been finally settled⁴. The subsequent events came to confirm this suspicion. Tigranes invaded Adiabene undoubtedly at the instigation of the Romans⁵. This made the king Vologeses to act resolutely: he settled the troubles connected with the uprising of Hyrcania, recognized its independence since he was resolved to keep Great Armenia and Adiabene under the Parthian influence. In 61 A.D., a new Parthian army entered North Mesopotamia and Armenia. Under the Parthian noble Monaeses and the king of Adiabene Monobazus it besieged Tigranes and the Roman forces in Tigranocerta. Corbulo dispatched two legions to back them and reinforced the Euphrates frontier. The Parthians did not succeed in capturing the capital. Meanwhile, Vologeses stood in Nisibis with his main forces watching the events in Armenia⁶.

Corbulo initiated talks with the King of Kings remembering his “[...] old and deep-seated principle to avoid the Roman arms” [Tacit., Ann., XV, 5]. Vologeses agreed “[...] to send ambassadors to the Roman emperor to discuss his application for Armenia and the establishment of peace on a firm footing” [Ibid.]⁷.

¹Perhaps for this case Henderson’s term “nominal suzerainty” is more adaptable. **B. W. Henderson**, op. cit., pp. 161–163.

²More precisely, he was the great-grandson of Archelaus of Cappadocia and Heorod the Great of Judaea. See **M.-L. Chaumont**, op. cit., p. 107. Obviously, this policy contained elements of Augustan policy aimed at the annexation of Armenia under the rule of client kings. **B. W. Henderson**, op. cit., pp. 178–182.

³Cf. **T. Mommsen**, *Res gestae divi Augusti*, Berolini, Weidemannos Vrlg., 1865, S. 116.

⁴M. Heil defines the situation as *der vermeintliche Sieg* (imaginary victory), **M. Heil**, op. cit., S. 86.

⁵Our primary sources give no information about the motives and aims of this invasion. One thing is out of doubt: Tigranes was not an independent actor, and there is no reason for qualifying the assault as his personal mistake or foolish adventure. See **T. E. Wiedemann**, *Tiberius to Nero*, CAH (2d. ed.), v. X, Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1996, p. 248; **M. T. Griffin**, *Nero: The End of a Dynasty*, New York, Routledge, 1987, p. 226.

Proposed by S. Eremyan the motive of Tigranes’ invasion seem more acceptable: he tried to regain the south-western regions of Great Armenia (Nisibin) which had been annexed by Parthia and joined to Adiabene by the terms of the treaty of A.D. 37. In this way, the king hoped to gain the loyalty of the Armenians. See **S. Eremyan**, *Armenia in the Contest of Rome and Parthia*, in *History of the Armenian Nation* (ed. by S. Eremyan), Yerevan, Publ. Acad. of Science, 1971, p. 742 (in Arm). Certainly, in this enterprise, the Roman interest must be traced as well: to test the readiness of the Parthians for resolute reaction. See **A. Stépanian**, op. cit., p. 211.

⁶**M.-L. Chaumont**, op. cit., pp. 108–109; **P. Asdourian**, *Die politischen Beziehungen zwischen Armenien und Rom von 190 v. Chr. bis 428 n. Chr.*, Venedig, Mechitaristenbuchdruckerei, 1911, S. 94–95.

⁷In this connection, an important question arises: at what extent the Parthian and Roman concepts of peace were comparable? About the concept and experience of the *pax Romana* see **E. Adler**, *Vergil’s Empire: Political Thought in Aeneid*, Lanham/New York/Oxford, Rowman & Littlefield Publ., 2003, pp. 200–207.

Meanwhile, both the Parthian and Roman forces had to leave Great Armenia. Which concerned the Roman nominee Tigranes as well¹. Reputedly, the sides returned to the terms of the settlement of A.D. 55².

But Nero and his close entourage rejected the proposals by the Parthians. The war party took the upper hand in the imperial court. It was the second half of Nero's reign marked with absolutistic traits. Moreover, the realistic responses to the challenges of the time were replaced by rhetorical and theatrical gesture³. A bellicose tone of behavior and gesture was adopted. According to that, Nero equipped a new army for annexing Armenia. The head of it was appointed the legate L. C. Paetus who had hitherto not shown himself as an able military leader. He formulated his task as follows: “[...] to impose on the conquered tributes, laws, and Roman jurisdiction in place of a phantom king” [Tacit., Ann., XV, 6]⁴.

2. *The campaign of Paetus to Armenia*

In 62 A.D. Rome had two armies in the East, which were under Corbulo and Paetus. As it becomes obvious from subsequent events, they had no elaborated plans for joint military and diplomatic actions. Each general pursued his own strategic interests aimed at his personal success and glory.

As to Corbulo, he tried to assure the court of Nero that Syria was the main target of Vologeses' proposed invasion. To prevent that, he crossed Euphrates and seized some important strategic positions on the opposite bank: “The bridge was now complete, and the hills in front were occupied, first by the allied cohorts, then by a legionary camp, with a speed and display of strength which induced the Parthians to drop the preparations for invading Syria and to stake their whole hopes upon Armenia” [Tacit., Ann., XV, 9]⁵. This account raises rather strange questions: why did the Parthian king move to Armenia, instead of confronting the enemy in North Mesopotamia; had he guarantees that Corbulo would not develop his initial success? The opponents of Corbulo explained it (and similar discrepancies in his actions) by the fact that everything was settled “[...] so that Vologeses might be pitted against another antagonist than Corbulo, and Corbulo risked no further the laurels earned in the course of so many years” [Tacit., Ann., XV, 6]⁶.

¹ J. Malitz, op. cit., p. 59; D. Shotter, Nero (2d. ed.), London/New York, 2005, p. 39.

² See Th. Mommsen, A History of Rome under the Emperors, London/New York, Routledge, 1999, p. 150.

³ See S. A. Takás, The Construction of Authority in Ancient Rome and Byzantium. The Rhetoric of Empire, Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press, 2009, pp. 58–59.

⁴ T. Mommsen interpreted the phrase as a plan of reorganizing Great Armenia into a Roman province. T. Mommsen, op. cit., p. 150. If so, Nero broke with the Armenian policy of Augustus: “When Artaxes, king of Great Armenia, was killed, though I could have made it a province (cum possem facere provinciam), I preferred, by example of our elders, to hand over that kingdom to Tigranes, son of king Artavasdes and grandson of Tigranes [...]” [Aug., RG, V, 27].

⁵ We do not concern the details of Paetus' campaign. About them see B. W. Henderson, op. cit., pp. 181–190; N. Debevoise, op. cit., pp. 187–192; K. Farrokh, Shadows in the Desert: Ancient Persia at War, New York, Osprey Publ., 2007, pp. 149–150.

⁶ It seems quite possible to find among the probable authors of this (and like) information A. M. Celsus and C. L. Mucianus who “in Armenia res proxime cum Corbulone gessere” [Plin., Nat. hist., VI, 40]. See M. Heil, op. cit., S. 37–38.

Meanwhile, Paetus invaded Armenia and felt himself in security. He chose the so-called southern route: from Cappadocia he led his legions to Sophene and passing through the Taurus Mountains' passes took steps to Tigranocerta. Soon, however, the legate was forced to abandon that plan. His avant-garde cohorts met with the excellent cavalry of the Parthians. They were routed in several combats, and the army had to retreat. Paetus turned for support to Corbulo who "[...] made his way by the shortest route not destitute of supplies to the district of Comagene, then to Cappadocia, and from Cappadocia to Armenia" [Tacit., Ann., XV, 12]. However, the opponents were not content with this official information and believed that: "Nor was there any haste on the part of Corbulo himself, who hoped that, if the dangers came to a head, the glory of a rescue would also be heightened" [Tacit., Ann., XV, 10]. The limited forces which Corbulo had taken with himself also showed that he did not plan to intervene into the Armenian affairs actively: "He ordered a thousand men from each of the three legions, with eight hundred auxiliary horses, and a body of similar strength from the cohorts, to prepare themselves for the road" [ibid.]¹.

The position of Paetus hardened by the fact that he had dispersed his forces and could not effectively cope with the adversary. He suffered losses, and soldiers began to desert. The enemy captured the passes of Taurus and severed his retreat to Sophene [Dio Cass, XLII, 21, 1]. Soon the Parthian and Armenian troops ransacked the Roman camp in Rhandea, in the Valley of Arsanias River. By the words of Tacitus: "Even the commander offered no resistance to adversity, but had abdicated all his military functions [...]" [Tacit., Ann., XV, 11]². He sent a new petition to Corbulo asking to come and save the eagles and standards of his unfortunate army. As to soldiers, they began remembering the disaster of Caudine Forks which happened in the Second Samnite War (327–304 B.C.) [Tacit., Ann., XV, 13]. In deep despondency, the unhappy commander decided to negotiate with the Parthian king and sent him a letter. Apparently, he had lost hopes for saving his army with Corbulo's support.

The negotiations, apparently, came to prove that the Parthian side was also informed about the details of the Caudine disaster. Moreover, it began modeling its actions coming from "the lessons" of that. This approach may at first seem improbable. But we are going to test that by sketching and juxtaposing the events of Caudine Forks and Rhandea recorded respectively by T. Livy and Tacitus.

The opposite records of Tacitus about Corbulo are attributed to his rhetorical style which "[...] opens the possibility of alternative metaphors concerning our understanding of public and private virtue". **J.-P. Rubiés**, Nero in Tacitus and Nero in Tacitism. The Historian's Craft, in Reflections of Nero: Culture, History and Representation (ed. by J. Elsner and J. Masters), London, Duckworth, 1994, p. 36.

¹ The sophisticated readers of Tacitus could observe a strict contrast between this fragment and the well-known fragment of the life of Agricolla. In identical situation he led "[...] fastest of the cavalry with infantry to assault the backs of the combatants" [Tacit., Agr., 26, 1]. See **Rh. Ash**, Following the Footsteps of Lucullus? Tacitus's Characterization of Corbulo, *Arethusa*, 39/2 (2006), p. 372, n. 47.

² **C. M. Gilliver**, Battle, in *The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare*, v. II, Rome from the Late Republic to the Late Empire (ed. Ph. Sabin, H. van Wees and M. Whitby), Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press, 2007, p. 153.

3. Comparison Sketch of the Caudine and Rhandean Combats

a. The Events of the Caudine Forks

In 321 B.C., under the consuls T. Veturius Calvinus and S. Albinus Postumius, two Roman armies made their way to Luceria, a town on the border of Samnium and Apulia. The Samnites trapped them in the narrow Caudine Forks cutting all possible exits. It raised panic among the legionnaires which Livy describes with artistic style and eloquence¹.

The Plans of the Sides

In this desperate condition, the Romans made “many fruitless efforts to force a passage”. So, they inclined to the idea of sending ambassadors and asking peace on equal terms (*pacem aequam*) [Liv., IX, 9, 4]². As to the Samnites, they faced the challenge: what to do? In search for response, according to the legend, they turned for advice to Pontius Herenius, the old and wise father of their commander-in-chief Gavius Pontius. And he proposed two opposite ways for settling the conflict. According to **the first**, the Romans “[...] should all be immediately dismissed from thence unhurt (*omnes... inuiolatos dimittendos*)”. **The second** demanded “[...] they should all, to a man, be put to death (*omnes interficiendos*)” [Liv., IX, 3, 6–7]. By the estimation of the old man, the first way was the best because was aimed “[...] to establish perpetual peace and friendship with a most powerful nation”. While the purpose of the second was “[...] to put off the return of war to the distance of many ages” [Liv., IX, 3, 9–10]. But G. Pontius and the other chiefs were inclined to find **the third** way. According to that, the Romans, “[...] both should be dismissed unhurt, and, at the same time, by the right of war (*iure belli*), terms imposed on them as vanquished (*uictis*)”. In response, the old man warned them that it “[...] neither procures friends, nor removes enemies” [Liv., IX, 9, 11].

The Samnite Action And Roman Reaction

The warning, however, did not change the mind of the Samnite leaders. They estimated the third way as the best and did their best to bring it about. They were irritated by the fact that the Romans did not acknowledge their real state.

The way under consideration denoted two opposite approaches to the solution of the conflict. **The first** demanded punishment for the Romans as the conquered side: they would be sent “[...] under the yoke (*sub iugum*) unarmed, each with a single garment”. After that, they would leave the territories of the Samnites. **The second** concerned the settlement of the relations of the

¹ E. T. Salmo, *Samnium and Samnites*, Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1967, pp. 223–226; G. Forsythe, *A Critical History of Early Rome: From Prehistory to the First Punic War*, Berkeley/Los Angeles, Univ. of California Press, 2005, pp. 298–300; A. Goldsworthy, *Roman Warfare*, London, Phoenix, 2007, pp. 44–45.

² About the negotiations see in detail L. Grossmann, *Roms Samnitenkriege: Historische und historio-graphische Untersuchungen zu den Jahre 327 bis 290 v. Chr.*, Düsseldorf, Wellen Vrlg., 2009, S. 66–69; H. H. Scullard, *A History of Roman World, 753 to 146 B.C.*, London/New York, Routledge, 2004, pp. 132–138.

Romans and Samnites for the future under the treaty of equality. It would give each of them opportunity to live in accordance with their own laws (*suis legibus*) [Liv., IX, 4, 3–4]. In other words, they would be recognized *societes liberae*. The Roman international law usually settled this kind of relations under the *ius gentium*¹.

After long discussions, the Romans accepted these conditions and sent the consuls to confer with G. Pontius. Livy pursues the historical traditions according to which they refused to conclude a treaty on the grounds that they had no authority for that. They stressed the impossibility of the case without the order of the Roman people (*iniussu populi*) [Liv., IX, 5, 1]. From the juridical point of view, they were, perhaps, right as they did not possess *imperium maius* enabling the generals to “[...] raise troops; to make war; to assume unlimited control over the allies and the citizens; to take the chief command and jurisdiction at home and in the field, rights which, without an order of the people, the consul is not permitted to exercise” [Salust, *Coniuratio*, XXIX, 2–3]².

By the words of Livy, instead of a treaty, a truce was signed under the surety of the consuls, legates, quaestors, and military tribunes. The Samnites agreed the treaty to be postponed and ratified by the Roman people. They demanded six hundred horsemen as hostages and threatened to put them to death if the treaty was not signed [Liv., IX, 5, 5]. Under these terms, the legionnaires were disarmed and sent under the yoke: “First, the consuls, nearly half naked, were sent under the yoke; then each officer, according to his rank, was exposed to disgrace, and the legions successively. The enemy stood on each side under arms, reviling and mocking them” [ibid.]. The consequent events are well known: after long discussions, the Senate denied the “ignominious peace”. Surprisingly, prevailed the opinion of Spurius Postumius, the defeated consul: “[...] none of the transactions at Caudium were directed by human wisdom” [Liv., IX, 9, 11]. The gods deprived of right reason both the Romans and enemy³. As to the peace engagement, it was recognized the private transaction of the consuls and their staff having no concern to the Senate and People. So, they resigned their offices. As private persons, they were led back to the Caudine Forks to be surrendered to the enemy under the heralds (*fetiales*). The Romans hoped to gain the upper hand over the Samnites sacrificing the persons responsible for the disgrace.

At the Caudine Forks, they met G. Pontius, who declined their new condi-

¹ More exactly, *ius gentium* in opposition to *ius civile* but in accordance with *ius naturale* since the latter concerned the rights of “all civilized nations”. See **B. Nicholas**, *Introduction to Roman Law*, Oxford, Clarendon, 1975, pp. 54–59; **P. Stein**, *Roman Law in European History*, Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1999, pp. 12–13.

² About the typology, content and historical background of *imperium maius* see **V. Ehrenberg**, *Imperium Maius in the Roman Republic*, *The American Journal of Philology*, 74/2 (1953), pp. 118–123; Cf. **R. T. Ridley**, *The Extraordinary Commands of the Late Republic: A Matter of Definition*, *Historia*, 30/3 (1981), pp. 289–290.

³ It is a typical scene of remission of *publica ignominia* consisting of two phases: a. consul takes over the responsibility for releasing the army of *infamia*; b. tries to acquit himself referring to the Fate. See **A. Cheung**, *The Political Implications of Imperial Military Defeat*, *Scholia*, N.S. 7/1 (1998), p. 112; **R. A. Kaster**, *Emotion, Restraint and Community in Ancient Rome*, Oxford, Oxford Univ. Press, 2005, p. 34.

tions formulating his objection as follows: “Do the Roman people disapprove of their legions being saved by an ignominious peace? Let them have their peace and return the captured legions to the conqueror” [Liv., IX, 11, 3]. In other words, the Samnite leader demanded comeback to the standpoint of the conflict and drawing a new scenario of the settlement. Certainly, the sides did not come to terms, and the war revived causing great losses.

Livy reports about the symmetrical reaction of the Romans: in 319 B.C., they avenged the disaster in Luceria with a victory which gave them chance to recover the lost standards and free six hundred hostages. If we trust him, the Romans passed under yoke seven thousand Samnite prisoners [Liv., IX 15, 6]¹.

The Third Samnite War followed (298–290 B.C.) again bloody and cruel. The Romans succeeded to gain the final victory, and the Samnites were finally subdued².

b. The Events around Rhandea

Disaster

The Parthian king pressed the besieged with more vigor. In response, Paetus wrote him a letter and, like the Caudine consuls, proposed to settle the conflict on the terms of *pax aequa* underlining that “Peace was an interest of both sides alike. [...] Rome had the world in reserve, with which to support the war” [Tacit., Ann., XV, 13]. The proposal was denied, and Paetus asked for an interview with Vologeses. The king entrusted the negotiations to Vasaces the cavalry-commander whom Monobazus of Adiabene joined later. And soon the sides came to terms: “The agreement was that the blockade of the legions should be raised, the whole of the troops withdrawn from Armenian territory, and the forts and supplies handed over to the Parthians. When all this had been consumed, Vologeses was to be accorded leave to send an embassy to Nero” [Tacit., Ann., XV, 14]. In his records, Corbulo added some details of the arrangement: “[...] a sworn guarantee was given by Paetus, in face of standards and in presence of witnesses deputed by the king, that not a Roman would enter Armenia until Nero’s dispatch came to hand intimating whether he assented to the peace” [Tacit., Ann., XV, 16]. Paetus emphasized that the peace treaty endorsement privilege (instead of the Senate and People) belonged exclusively to the emperor.

Presumably, there was also another point of the agreement which the Romans preferred to pass over with silence. Tacitus mentions about it in the form of rumor: “Rumor added that the legions had been passed under the yoke; and other particulars were given, harmonizing well enough with our unfortunate position, and indeed paralleled by the behavior of the Armenians. For not only did they enter the fortifications before the Roman column left, but they lined the roads, identifying and dragging off slaves and sumpter-animals which had

¹ **W. V. Harris**, *War and Imperialism in Republican Rome, 327–70 B.C.*, Oxford, Clarendon, 1985, pp. 175–182. **T. J. Cornell**, *The Conquest of Italy*, CAH, 7/2, *The Rise of Rome to 220 B.C.*, 1989, p. 370.

² **T. J. Cornell**, *op. cit.*, p. 380.

been captured long before; even clothing was snatched and weapons detained, our terrified troops offering no resistance, lest some pretext for hostilities should emerge” [Tacit., Ann., XV, 15; cf. Suet., Nero, 39, 1]¹.

The said outlines the essence of the policy of the Parthian king. It was aimed at the combining of two opposite approaches. On the one hand, he pursued a stable peace between the two super-powers – “a equitate quam sanguine, causa quam armis” [Tacit., Ann., XV, 2]. On the other hand, he was disposed to demonstrate his military advantage. The aphoristic formula of the king makes the idea of the combination more distinct: “He had sufficiently demonstrated his power; he had also given an example of clemency (satis adprobatam vim; datum et lenitatis experimentum)” [Tacit., Ann., XV, 24]. In this light, the parallel between his policy and the middle course of G. Pontius takes very probable shapes.

The same is true about the king’s stance to negotiate with Nero at every stage of the settlement of the conflict. It may be considered as an answer to the “reproach” of Postumius to the Samnites: “Had their reason been sound, would it have been difficult, during the time which they spent in sending for old men from home to give them advice, to send ambassadors to Rome, and negotiate a peace and treaty with the Senate, and with the People?” [Liv., IX, 9, 12].

A third parallel is also obvious. The Parthian king followed the tactics according to which “[...] matters might have rested under a truce, that is, until their ambassadors should have brought from Rome, either certain victory or peace” [Ibid.]. He tried to prevent the possible ruses of the Roman diplomacy. And more probably the source of his information was again the text by Livy.

Innovative proposals for the settlement of the conflict

Vologeses and his entourage did not blindly follow the text of Livy. They did their best to correct the Caudine plot paradigm with new approaches for accomplishing their main strategic plan. The consequent events came to prove that the Romans also were on that way.

After the Rhandea disaster, in the spring of 63, Vologeses sent a new embassy to Nero demanding once again to recognize his brother Tiridates the legitimate king of Great Armenia. Besides, his epistle contained a principally new proposal: “Nor would Tiridates have declined to come to Rome and receive his diadem, were he not detained by the scruples attaching to his priesthood, he would visit the standards and effigies of the emperor (signa et effigies principis), there to inaugurate his reign in the presence of the legions” [Tacit., Ann., XV, 24].

At first, the entourage of Nero took the proposal of the Parthian king as irony since he “was asking for a thing which he had already taken”. So, the state Council was held and it was decided to decline “the ignominious peace” and declare readiness to continue the war to suitable victory. At first sight, it resembled the Senate’s refusal to negotiate on the terms of G. Pontius. But

¹ Tacitus has depicted the scene in accordance with the concept of the pudor (pudor domi militiae) which was assessed as “a kind of slavery”. See **R. A. Kaster**, op. cit., 2005, p. 54.

besides this official reply, Nero’s court sent also an unofficial message: “[...] presents leaving room for hope that Tiridates would not make the same request in vain, if he brought his suit in person (*si preces ipse attulisset*)” [Tacit., Ann., XV, 25]. This was the real answer by Nero to the innovative proposal of Vologeses. And we have no reason for identifying (or even comparing) it with what Corbulo proposed to Tiridates in 58 A.D.¹. In this case the conditions were absolutely different.

The two proposals may seem even identical. However, the difference is rather essential. During the conflict and peace negotiations, Vologeses emphasized his position of the leader of the defense League of the Transeuphratean countries. It is more than obvious in his response to Paetus to start the truce arrangement. He declared that he was waiting for his brothers, Pacorus and Tiridates: “[...] for considering what was to be their decision with regard to Armenia” [Tacit., Ann., XV, 14]. As to Nero and his court, they, on the contrary, were demanding Tiridates to enter into relations with Rome on his behalf, besides his participation in the League. Later, Corbulo uttered the other side of that demand: “[...] Vologeses would better consult the interest of the Parthian nation by an alliance with Rome than by a policy of reciprocal injury” [Tacit., Ann., XV, 27]².

Semantic Code of the Rhandean Peace Ceremony

Though the primary sources contain no distinct information about the efforts of the sides to combine these approaches, it is obvious, that they came to terms around the problem. The Rhandean treaty ceremony is the best evidence of that.

Indeed, Nero and his court officially preferred war. Corbulo was appointed commander-in-chief of all the Roman forces in the East, “[...] his powers were raised to nearly the same level as that allowed by the Roman nation to Pompey for the conduct of a Pirate war” [Tacit., Ann., XV, 14]³. He transferred the demoralized legions of Paetus to Syria and enlisted a new army from well-trained legions. He concentrated his *grande armée* in Melitene to enter the borders of

¹ After T. Mommsen, the prominent advocates of this idea were W. Schur and his followers. **W. Schur**, *Zur neronischen Orientpolitik*, *Klio*, 20 (1926), S. 216–217. As to M. Hammond, he attributed the idea and its fulfillment exclusively to Corbulo. **M. Hammond**, *op. cit.*, pp. 100–101.

² It seems an expression of the foreign policy of Rome from formative period which repeated in history from time to time: “The hallmark of the Republic’s peacemaking – its readiness in many cases to end conflicts on terms that would reconcile the defeated to their new status as partners [...]” **N. Rosenstein**, *War, Peace, and Reconciliation at Rome*, in *War, Peace, and Reconciliation in the Ancient World* (ed. by K. Raaflaub), Malden/Oxford, Blackwell, 2007, p. 239.

³ Proceeding from this comparison, scholars usually define the power of Corbulo as *imperium maius*. See **M. Hammond**, *op. cit.*, p. 100, n. 4; **H. H. Scullard**, *op. cit.*, p. 266; **D. Shotter**, *op. cit.*, p. 39. For us another approach is acceptable: Corbulo (*legatus principis*) executed the supreme military power *mandatu Neronis* [Tacit., Ann., XV, 17]. From Augustan times, this was an established rule because the emperors were considered the commanders-in-chief of Roman armies. See **J. R. Fears**, *The Ideology of Victory at Rome*, *ANRW*, II, 17/2 (1981), p. 752; **T. Hölscher**, *Images of War in Greece and Rome: Between Military Practice, Public Memory, and Cultural Symbolism*, *The Journal of Roman Studies*, 93 (2003), p. 16.

Greater Armenia. He had at his disposal four legions (III, VI, V, XV), detachments from Illyricum and Egypt with the allied horse and foot, auxiliaries of the tributary princes [Tacit., Ann., XV, 25]¹. As to the Parthians, they also showed martial energy to restart the conflict.

Corbulo entered Armenia choosing the road by which L. Lucullus had proceeded in 69 B.C.². Nevertheless, the tension did not bring to a new military clash. Instead, the adversaries initiated new negotiations. The “marginal” gestures, words and actions made up the real essence of them. The Roman embassy adopted “not an unconciliatory tone”, and expressed a principally new estimation of the conflict: both Parthia and Rome had received a lesson against arrogance (*documento adversus superbiam*) [Tacit., Ann., XV, 27]. It is difficult to define if that was only the opinion of Corbulo or the marker of a new eastern policy of Nero? In both cases one thing is doubtless: it traced equality between Rome and Parthia in settlement of the destructive conflict³.

This consideration makes grounds for speaking about the most significant deviation from the Caudine plot. Instead of black-and-white (either ... or) representation of the conflict, it reached the many sided understanding of that (both ... and), which opened the door for compromise. As the first step to this, the sides came to terms about the time and place of peace arrangement: “The date was to be early; for the place, the scene of the recent investment of Paetus and the legions was chosen by the barbarians in memory of their success there” [Tacit., Ann., XV, 28]. As to Corbulo, “[...] he expected his men to wipe out the ill repute that had attached to them before” [Dio Cass., LXII, 23, 2]. He ordered the son of Paetus, a tribune, to bury the relicts of the fallen legionnaires left in the field of Rhandea.

On the fixed day the Romans arrived to the camp of Tiridates (in castra Tiridatis). Despite Dio Cassius, Tacitus underlines that only Tiridates took part in the Rhandean talks and ceremony. Vologeses, Pacorus and Monobazus kept an eye on the process at a distance. If this version is right, we can say that the Parthian side acceded to the demand of Nero, and Tiridates participated in the peace arrangement on his behalf.

We distinguish three stages in the Rhandean treaty ceremony performed during several days.

The prologue: with his proxies and guards, Corbulo arrived to the camp of Tiridates to meet him and discuss the details of the forthcoming ceremony. Both of them descended from horses and clasped hands (*et pedes uterque dexteris miscuere*) [Tacit., Ann., XV, 28]. It was a well-known detail of the friend-

¹Despite the rumors about Corbulo’s drawing near, the Parthian king did not show signs of haste in his actions. At his demand the legionnaires constructed a bridge over Arsianias River without any real need of that [Dio Cass., LXII, 21, 4].

² About the parallels of the military activity of these two generals in Armenia see **R. Ash**, *op. cit.*, pp. 364–373.

³ Similar status of equality had been achieved in the times of Tiberius and Artabanus II. See **A. D. H. Bivar**, *op. cit.*, p. 70; **K. H. Ziegler**, *Die Beziehungen zwischen Röm und Partherreich*, Wiesbaden, Vrlg. Reiner, 1964, S. 48. About the typology of similar “agreements” see in detail **D. Wittman**, *How a War End. A Rational Model Approach*, *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 23/4 (1979), pp. 744–749.

ship ceremony in Antique tradition¹. In the talks, Corbulo emphasized the desirability of “the safe and salutary course”. Tiridates agreed with that and confirmed his readiness to receive the emblem of royalty (*insigne regium*) from the hands of Nero. The end of the dialogue was marked by a kiss (*osculo*) of the two actors [Tacit., Ann., XV, 29].

From this point of view, it is worth to remember that a kiss denoted the equality of the social rank of two persons in the Old Iranian tradition². However it is attested in the Roman tradition as well³. So it is right to think that the Eastern and Western traditions were combined in a single ritual text to define the status of Tiridates.

The process: took place after some days in the same Rhandean valley. From modern point of view, it can be formulated as “diffusion of military activity to community” by means of ritual and ideological concept⁴. And it represented an unprecedented event – a joint *contio* of the Parthian, Armenian and Roman troops [Dio Cass., LXII, 23, 3]. Based on the records of Corbulo the account of Tacitus is more detailed: “[...] on the one hand, cavalry range in squadrons and carrying their national decorations (*imaginibus patriis*), on the other, columns of legionaries standing amid a glitter of eagles and standards and effigies of gods which gave the scene resemblance to a temple” [Tacit., Ann., XV, 29]. The apogee of the ceremony was the next scene, where Nero was present “in his image”: “[...] in the centre, the tribunal sustained a curule chair; and the chair a statue of Nero (*effigiem Neronis*). To this Tiridates advanced, and, after the usual sacrifice of victims, lifted the diadem from his head and placed it at the feet of the image” [ibid.]. The second part of the coronation ritual was thought to be held at Rome: Tiridates would receive back the diadem from the hands of Nero.

The situation shows obvious parallels with the coronation of Tigranes II, king of Great Armenia, by Gn. Pompey in the Roman camp in 66 B.C. Entering the camp, Tigranes wore both tiara and diadem, the symbols of his royal dignity. He came up to Pompey and cast aside the diadem (*τὸ τε διάδημα ἀπορρίψαντα*) ready to prostrate on the ground. In return, Pompey: “[...] springing up hastily, bound on the diadem (*ajnadhmativ*) and seated him upon a chair close by” [Dio Cass., XXXVI, 52, 3–4]. After that, the general articulated the meaning of the ritual act: “[...] he had not lost the kingdom of Armenia, but had gained the friendship of the Romans (*τὴν τῶν Ῥωμαίων φιλίαν προσειληφῶ*)

¹ G. Herman, *Ritualized Friendship and Greek City*, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1987, pp. 50–54.

² By the words of Herodotus, “When they (the Persians) meet one another in the roads, by this you discern whether those who meet are of equal rank, for instead of greeting by words they kiss one other on the mouth; but if one of them is a little inferior to the other, they kiss one other on the cheeks, and if one is of much less noble rank than the other, he falls down before him and does worship him” [Herod., I, 134, 1].

³ Plin., *Panegyricus*, 71, 4. Cf. A. Wallace-Hadrill, *Civilis Princeps: Between Citizen and King*, *The Journal of Roman Studies*, 72/2 (1982), p. 33.

⁴ “A large part of human and historical significance of wars thus lies not so much in their factual results (collective victory or defeat, individual triumph or death) as in emotional, ethical, and ideological experience and concepts connected with war and warfare” T. Hölscher, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

εἶη)” [Ibid.]¹.

To complete the scene, it appears necessary to concern the legal meaning of the two crowns of the kings of Great Armenia. The problem is discussed in some modern studies. According to them, the kings received their tiara (ἡ τιάρα ῥοθα) from the state Assembly of Greater Armenia held periodically at the slopes of the sacred mountain Niphate in the district Daranalia. It symbolized their supreme authority in the Armenian community². As to the diadem (to; diavdhma), which originated from the Hellenistic state practice and theory, it symbolized the legitimacy of the king’s authority by the international standards³.

Tiridates bore the tiara while travelling to Rome [Suet., Nero, XIII, 2]. Probably, he received it in 54 A.D. being recognized as the lawful sovereign of Greater Armenia by the nobility and the Assembly. He also received the diadem from Vologeses I. It happened in 61 A.D., when the Roman nominee Tigranes was yet on the Armenian throne. The Parthian king convened the Council of the Transeuphratean league, accused the Romans of injustice “[...] and bound the diadem on the brows of Tiridates” [Tacit., Ann., XV, 2]⁴. Presumably, it was the same diadem which the latter placed at the feet of the image of Nero.

The epilogue: “To his glories Corbulo added courtesy and a banquet (epulasque)” [Tacit., Ann., XV, 30, 5]⁵. During that Tiridates observed some novelties which filled him with admiration for ancient customs of the Romans (admiratione prisci moris). And it seems more attractive to trace in these novelties (besides the details of camp service rituals whereof Tacitus records) the essential sides of the Rhandean arrangement.

For this assumption we proceed from the coronation of Tigranes II which was also closed with a banquet (δεῖπνον) [Dio Cass., XXXVI, 53, 4]. Supposedly, it performed a ritual of the initiation of the Armenian king into the Roman friendship. Discontent with Pompey’s settlement of the Armenian affairs, the young prince Tigranes refused to participate in the banquet and collaborate with the Romans. In other words, he rejected to be declared amicus populi Romani. This incurred the general’s hatred who confined him. Later, when the prince denied paying contribution, Pompey put him in chains and kept as war

¹ Nearly the same scene is traceable during the arrival of Germanicus in Armenia and coronation of Zenon in Artaxata in A.D. 18. See **E. Koestermann**, Die Mission des Germanicus im Orient, Historia, 7(1958), S. 342.

² **A. Stepanyan**, Metamorphoses of History in Greater Armenia, v. 1, The Age of the Artaxiads, Yerevan, S. Khachents. Printinfo, 2012, pp. 312–317 (in Arm.).

³ **M. Lemosse**, Le couronnement de Tiridate. Remarques sur le statut des protectorats romains, in Mélanges en l’honneur de G. Gidel, Paris, Librairie Sirey, 1961, pp. 455–468; **Ed. Champlin**, Nero, Cambridge (M.A.)/London, Harvard Univ. Press, 2003, p. 226.

⁴ **M. Heil**, op. cit., S. 101.

⁵ On the significance of banquets in the Roman ceremonies of amicitia see **D. Konstan**, Friendship in Classical World, Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1997, pp. 137–140. In this conjunction, it is worthy to remember that the banquets were called to establish not only the unity but also the hierarchical relations of their participants. **J. Goddard**, The Tyrant at Table, in Reflections of Nero, p. 70. And from Roman point of view, it indicated the unity of two opposite social institutions giving beneficia and replaying gratia. **B. Inwood**, Reading Seneca. Stoic Philosophy at Rome, Oxford, Clarendon, 2005, p. 69.

captive.

If this restoration is right, we can assert that Corbulo's banquet had nearly the same meaning and was arranged with the end of dedicating Tiridates into the Roman friendship. Soon, the said found its affirmation in diplomatic actions: Vologeses I turned to the Romans with a note in which he outlined the conditions of Tiridates' voyage to Rome. Their focus was his status in accordance with Roman political and symbolic axiology: "[...] Tiridates should be exposed to none of the outward signs of vassalage (*imaginem servitii*), should not give up his sword, should not be debarred from embracing of the provincial governors or be left to stand and wait at the doors, and in Rome should receive equal distinction with the consuls (*consulibus honor esset*)" [Tacit., *Ann.*, XV, 31]. In return, the Roman side uttered its demand about the hostages from all the members of Transeuphratean league – Parthia, Athropatene, Great Armenia and Adiabene [Dio Cass., LXIII, 1, 1].

Dio's account about the travel of Tiridates to Rome supplements the note of Vologeses with new details: "Three thousand Partihan horsemen and numerous Romans besides followed in his train. They were received by gaily decorated cities and peoples who shouted many compliments" [Dio Cass., LXIII, 2, 1]. The procession showed obvious semblance with the well-known Roman ceremony *adventus* – arrival of a high ranked magistrate (proconsul) to a province. It was first of all aimed at the establishing of *consensus omnium*⁶. In other words, Tiridates "carried his friendship" from eastern peripheries to the center of the Roman world.

However, we are not going to get involved with the details of these and subsequent events – Tiridates' nine months long voyage and coronation at Rome in 66. All that is well attested by primary sources, and the logic of events makes grounds for their adequate interpretation⁷.

Conclusion

Two events are distinct in Roman history. Though separated by centuries, they show some obvious features of the common plot. They began with similar standpoints – the surrounding and surrendering of the Roman army to the enemies in closed locations, the Caudine Forks and Rhandean Valley. However, in the first case (321 B.C.), a compromise solution of the conflict was not found. Rome recovered military activity and at last subjugated the Samnits on account of numerous losses (290 B.C.). As to the second conflict, it shows obvious efforts of the participants to come to terms. After the Rhandean disaster, the

⁶ S. G. Mac Cormack, *Change and Continuity in Late Antiquity: The Ceremony of Adventus*, *Historia*, 21 (1979), pp. 722–723.

⁷ Nero's entourage was going to use Tiridates' arrival to convince the Romans in the surrender of the Parthians. Seneca also took part in this propaganda, though with his specific motivation. The heroine of his last tragedy Agrippina prophesied: "The humble Parthians will bid for [Nero's] bloody hand [...], but he will give his throat to the enemies deserted, destructed and deprived of everything" [Octavia, 627–631]. Cf. P. Kragelund, *Nero's Luxuria in Tacitus and in Octavia*, *The Classical Quarterly*, 50/2 (2000), pp. 505–506.

conflicting sides – Rome and Parthia – recognized the rational compromise as a desirable alternative to war. A unique mode of international relations was established: carrying on his membership in Transeuphratean league, the Armenian king entered into friendly relations with Rome and was recognized *amicus populi Romani*. The semiotic code of this new position of Great Armenia can be formulated in the form of an algorithm of equivalent elements – both ... and (both Parthia ... and Rome). It signified a principally new settlement of the Armenian problem achieved through ebbs and tides of the Ten Years War. It was aimed to secure the interests of all the sides of the conflict who hoped to gain guarantees of stability on the Euphrates frontier. And the hopes came true: the Rhandean treaty secured peace for about fifty years¹.

It must be added that this optimal settlement paradoxically coincided with the great domestic instability in Rome – the economic crisis, uprisings and unrest in provinces, schemes of nobility and philosophers, fire of the City, persecutions of the Christians. In Nero's response to them, the artistic and rhetoric gesture began to prevail. The said is also true about Tiridates' pompous coronation at Rome: Nero spent on it an enormous sum counting more than 400.000000 H.S.².

The next problem of our concern – whether the conflicting sides corrected their current policy proceeding from the Caudine experience – did not attain an absolutely undoubted solution. One thing is distinct – the Romans truly, the Parthians most probably saw parallelism between the two events. And this historical background was present in the “reverse perspective” of the main actors of the time on the both banks of the Euphrates.

¹ In other words, proposed by T. Mommsen and brought to its heights by W. Schur the concept of Nero's Armenian policy with a single goal – a Parthian appanage under nominal Roman suzerainty – appears groundless. Cf. **M. Heil**, *op. cit.*, S. 200–201.

² Nero spent on Tiridates' coronation – voyage, ceremonies, banquets, and entertainments – a sum counting at least 200.000000 H.S. [Dio Cass., LXIII, 1, 1]. It must be added to the 200.000000 H. S which Tiridates received from the emperor in the form of “various kinds of gifts” [Dio Cass., LXIII, 6, 5]. According to Suetonius, the sum made up more than 300.000000 H.S. For comparison, it must be remembered that the yearly budget of Roman Empire made up nearly 800.000000 H.S. See **Ed. Champlin**, *op. cit.*, p. 227.

ՄԵԾ ՀԱՅՔԸ ԵՎ ԵՓՐԱՏԻ ՍԱՀՄԱՆԸ
Ք.Հ. 60-ԱԿԱՆ ԹԹ.
(Հակամարտություն, գաղափարներ, հանգուցալուծում)

(ԱՄՓՈՓՈՒՄ)

Հոդվածը խնդիր ունի լուսաբանելու հայոց պատմության մի հույժ կարևոր դրվագ՝ իր տարաբնույթ ընդգրկմամբ՝ ռազմական, դիվանագիտական, իրավական և այլն: Խոսքը, այսպես կոչված, պարթևահռոմեական տասնամյա պատերազմի (54-64) ընթացքի, ավարտի և արդյունքների նորմատիվ հաստատագրման մասին է: Մի հիմնախնդիր, որն ավելի քան հարյուր տարի հետազոտական սևեռումի առարկա է: Սկզբնաղբյուրները, թեպետ բազմաքանակ չեն, բայց պարունակում են բավական հարուստ և հիմնավոր տեղեկույթ՝ Կ. Տակիտոս, Սվետոնիոս, Հավստինոս Փլարինոս, Դիոն Կասսիոս:

Արդի հետազոտողներից շատերը, տուրք տալով սկզբնաղբյուրներին, իրենց գիտաղացքը կառուցում են ըստ հռոմեացի ըմբռնման: Հայդմ պատերազմի ընթացքը և արդյունքները մեկնաբանում են իբրև հռոմեական գենքի և դիվանագիտության իրական կամ ձևական հաղթանակ: Ընդամին, այս ամենում Պարթևստանին և Մեծ Հայքին վերագրվում է սոսկ կրավորական դերակատարություն:

Այս և նման այլ կարծրակերպերի հաղթահարման նպատակով հոդվածում առաջ են քաշվում և հիմնավորվում հերտևյալ հիմնադրույթները.

- 50-ական թվականներին ձևավորվել և մեծ ռազմաքաղաքական կշիռ ունեւ Ադրեփրատյան պաշտպանական միությունը (summaciva): Վերջինիս առաջատարը (հեգեմոն) Պարթևստանն էր, կազմի մեջ ընդգրկված էին Ատրպատականը, Մեծ Հայքը, Ադիաբենեն և (հույժ հավանական է) Աղվանքը: Նրանցից յուրաքանչյուրն ուներ իր իրավունքներն ու պարտականությունները: Կարևորագույն որոշումներն ընդունվում էին միության խորհրդում:
- Միությունը մշակել էր իր ռազմավարությունն ու մարտավարությունը՝ հիմնված պատմական փորձի վրա: Նպատակն էր՝ ապահովել կայուն խաղաղություն Եփրատյան հահմանին: Այս կապակցությամբ հոդվածում բանաձևված է մի ենթադրույթ այն մասին, որ պարթևաց և հայոց արքունիքներում քաջատեղյակ էին Հռոմի պատմությանը և մասավանդ նրա դրամատիկ դրվագներին: Ի մասնավորի, խոսքը Ք.ա. 321 թվականի *Կավդիոսի կիրճի* աղետի մասին է, երբ հռոմեական բանակը շրջապատվեց և անձնատուր եղավ սամնիտներին: Նույնը կատարվեց նաև Մեծ Հայքում. 61 թվականին զորավար Յ. Պետուսոն և իր լեգիոնները շրջապատվեցին Հռանդեայում և ստիպված եղան ձանաչել իրենց

պարտությունը և անձնատուր լինել: Հարադրելով այս երկու իրադարձությունները՝ Անդրեփրատյան միությունն իր ձեռքն առավ հակամարտության խաղաղ հանգուցալուծման դիվանագիտական նախաձեռնությունը:

- Հռոմեացի պատմիչներ Տ. Լիվիոսի և Կ. Տակիտոսի վկայությունների զուգահեռմամբ՝ հողվածում փորձ է արված բացահայտելու երկու հակամարտությունների խաղընթացը (սցենար): Թեպետ մի շարք ընդհանրությունների, դրանցում առկա են նաև ակնառու տարբերություններ: Դրանք վերաբերում են առավելաբար հակամարտությունների հանգուցալուծման խնդրին: Կավդիումի կիրճում հռոմեացիներին հաջողվեց դիվանագիտական հնարքներով փրկել իրավիճակը, ապա վերսկսել պատերազմը և հասնել հաղթանակի: Այլ էր իրավիճակը Հռանդեայում. Անդրեփրատյան միությունն աստ ցուցաբերեց մեծ հետողականություն. հակառակորդին անցկացրեց անարգանքի լծի տակով և նրան պարտադրեց *իր խաղաղությունը*:
- Հարդյունս տևական բանակցությունների, կողմերը գնացին փոխզիջման: Կնքվեց մի պայմանագիր, որն ինչ-որ չափով հիշեցնում էր Տիգրան II-ի ժամանակաշրջանի իրողությունը: Մեծ Հայքը բարեկամական հարաբերություններ էր հաստատում ժամանակի երկու գերտերությունների հետ: Նշանագրային (սեմիոտիկ) բանաձևմամբ այն ենթադրում էր փոխլրացման (և...և) կարգավիճակ, որն ընդունակ էր Եփրատի սահմանին ապահովել երկարատև հոմեոստասիս: Ներոնի վարչակազմն այնքան էր շահագրգռված հիմնախնդրի նման հազուցալուծմամբ, որ պատրաստ էր կայսրության տարեկան եկամտի կեսը (400 միլիոն սեստերց) ծախսել հայոց նորընծա արքա Տրդատ I-ին Հռոմ հրավիրելու և թագադրելու համար:

ВЕЛИКАЯ АРМЕНИЯ И ЕВФРАТСКАЯ ГРАНИЦА В 60-Х ГОДАХ ПО Р.Х. (Конфликт, идеи, урегулирование)

(РЕЗЮМЕ)

Целью статьи является освещение одного из важных фрагментов армянской истории в военном, дипломатическом и правовом аспектах. Речь идет о так называемой десятилетней войне (54–64 гг.) и нормативном урегулировании ее результатов с точки зрения международного права. Эта проблема уже более ста лет является предметом исследования многих ученых. Освещающие ее первоисточники, правда, немногочисленные (К. Тацит, Светоний, Иосиф Флавий, Дион Кассий) содержат, однако, богатую и важную информацию.

Под влиянием этих первоисточников, многие современные исследователи подходят к разрешению данной проблемы следуя проримской концепции. В соответствии с этим, они представляют ход войны и ее основные результаты как реальную или формальную победу Рима. Что же касается Парфии и Великой Армении, то им приписывается пассивная роль.

С целью преодоления подобных стереотипов в статье ставятся и обосновываются следующие идеи.

- В 50-х годах был основан и пользовался большим влиянием союз Трансэвфратских государств (*συνμαχία*). Его гегемоном была Парфия, а членами Атропатена, Великая Армения, Адиабена и (вероятно) Кавказская Албания. Каждое из государств имело свои права и обязанности. Важнейшие решения принимались на Совете союза.
- Союз разработал и претворял в жизнь свою стратегию и тактику, основанную на опыте исторического прошлого. Его цель заключалась в установлении устойчивого мира на евфратской границе. В этой связи в статье выдвигается гипотеза о том, что в правящих кругах Парфии и Армении были хорошо осведомлены о драматических периодах римской истории. Речь идет, в частности, о событиях, развернувшихся в Кавдинском ущелье, в 321 г. до Р.Х., когда римская армия была окружена и вынуждена капитулировать. То же самое случилось и в Великой Армении: в 61 году, легат Ц. Пет и его легионы были окружены в Рандее и признали свое полное поражение. Сопоставив эти два события, Трансэвфратский союз взял в свои руки инициативу дипломатического урегулирования конфликта.

- Сопоставление информации римских историков Т. Ливия и К. Тацита, позволяет восстановить ход развития двух конфликтов. Несмотря на ряд общих черт, в них имеются и весьма значительные расхождения, касающиеся проблемы разрешения конфликтов. В Кавдинском ущелье римлянам удалось спасти положение с помощью дипломатических уловок. Далее они возобновили войну и одержали победу. Иначе сложилась ситуация в Рандее. Трансъевфратский союз в своих действиях продемонстрировал большую последовательность: провел неприятеля “под игом” бесчестия и навязал ему *собственное понимание мира*.
- Вследствие долгих переговоров, стороны пошли на компромисс. Был заключен договор, в некоторой мере напоминавший реалии времен Тиграна II: Великая Армения вступала в амикальные отношения с двумя сверхдержавами того времени. В семиотическом оформлении он представлял ситуацию комплементарности (и...и), способную обеспечить долговременный гомеостасис на евфратской границе. Режим Нерона был так заинтересован в таком разрешении конфликта, что пожертвовал половину годового дохода бюджета империи (400 миллионов сестерциев), чтобы пригласить армянского царя Тиридата I в Рим и короновать.