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#### **Հասարակական և հումանիտար գիտություններ**

(Աստվածաբանություն, արևելագիտություն, գրականագիտություն, ժուռնալիստիկա, իրավագիտություն, լեզվաբանություն, մանկավարժություն, պատմություն, սոցիոլոգիա, տնտեսագիտություն և կառավարում, փիլիսոփայություն և հոգեբանություն, քաղաքագիտություն և միջազգային հարաբերություններ)

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## **WHAT PROBLEM MUST CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS FACE IN EASTERN PARTNERSHIP COUNTRIES? WHERE IS ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT?**

The European Union (EU) is cooperating with the Eastern Partnership countries in many areas - Common Security Defence Policy (CSDP) being one of them. Moreover, peace-making in its neighbourhood has been marked a priority as an 'essential aspect of the EU's external action' [1]. Thus CSDP is one of the mechanisms in the toolbox of the EU to influence the security dynamics, including in the neighbourhood. The EU is operating through CSDP missions in two Eastern Partnership countries: Ukraine and Georgia, deployed as a response to requests after the 'Maidan' protests and the accompanying events of 2014 and the Russia-Georgian war of 2008 respectively. This paper will analyse both missions separately and answer two research questions: *What problems must CSDP missions and operations face in Eastern Partnership countries? Where is room for improvement?* First, it is observed that in the region between the EU and Russia, where the interests of the two do not always coincide, the missions are deployed only after several requests by the governments of those states, which tend to ask for a large mandate with high political stakes, however they end up with limited and largely technocratic ones. Even though the two cases differ in their objectives and operational capacities, they do share similar obstacles. The most prominent one is the Russian factor that plays a fundamental role both when planning the missions and drawing its limits and during the implementation. The second problem, among other reasons deriving also from the first one, is the scope of the mandate that falls short of the requesting governments' demands, and accordingly offers too little to fundamentally address the issues it seeks to do. Low-level public diplomacy, limited budget, poor cooperation and coordination of the EU bodies are identified in this paper as additional obstacles towards the successful realisation of these missions.

**EUAM Ukraine:** This chapter aims at analysing the problems of the Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform (EUAM) in Ukraine. The chapter starts out with a review of the CSDP mandate in Ukraine with an emphasis on its shortcomings. The following section is dedicated to the analysis of the geopolitical environment in which the mission takes place. The chapter concludes with recommendations on a possible improvement of the mission.

The EUAM mission in Ukraine was launched in December 2014 in order to mentor and assist the Ukrainian authorities in civilian security sector reform, including police and

the rule of law. The mission's purpose is to stabilise the country through promoting democracy and restoring public confidence in security services [2].

The EUAM mission was deployed after a series of repeated requests from Ukraine asking the EU for a monitoring mission with regional presences in Crimea and the East of Ukraine. However, the EU did not provide a monitoring mission but an advisory mission with headquarters in Kiev instead. So, the difference between Ukraine's earlier expectations and the true character of the mission provided by the EU created a base for the criticism that perceives the mission as ineffective because of its insufficient mandate [3].

The problematic part with the mission started with the formulation of the mandate by the European Council. The practical part of the mandate was not clear to the Ukrainian partners since it was defined quite broadly and vaguely [4]. The Ukrainian host state institutions were excluded from the formulation of the mission's mandate completely and only realised the mission concerned them once the mission was already in place. This is partly given by the different understanding of the concept of 'security service' which differs in Western European countries and in post-Soviet countries. While in the Western countries 'security service' regards law-enforcement agencies and agencies which ensure the rule of law (courts and prosecutors), in post-Soviet countries the concept includes security services and the security of a state not of a citizen. That is why some of the Ukrainian state agencies such as the Prosecutor's General Office were surprised that the EUAM mandate was aimed at cooperating with them [3].

As mentioned above, the mandate of EUAM is considered to be insufficient. The mission does not possess an operational capacity, therefore it cannot provide any assistance or operational support because the mandate of the mission is only advisory in scope, not operational. Consequently, the mandate does not take into account Ukraine's needs [5]. Furthermore, Ukrainian partners mentioned that the mission also lacks a provision of technical equipment, trainings and assistance [3].

One of the main goals on the EUAM mission is to restore the trust of people in the Ukrainian security sector. That is because of the prominent extent of corruption in Ukraine. To tackle this issue Ukraine does not need to be given advice on what reforms to implement, but it needs advice on how to perform these reforms by the mission's assistance [6]. In addition, there is a little cooperation - if none - between the two EU organs working in Ukraine: the EU Delegation and the EUAM mission itself. The EU technocrats who make up the majority of the EU Delegation personnel do not recognise cooperation with EUAM. Therefore, the non-cooperation between these two organs makes any possible successful impact of the mission more impossible [6].

The mission has also been criticised for its administrative issues, which have been hindering some actual progress with the reforms in Ukraine. The mission complained about the slow pace of interaction in daily communication and slow progress in hiring personnel

or finding the premises [3]. Connected to this issue is also the lack of the mission's publicity. For example, the mission's official website was launched six months after EUAM's deployment. Also, the mission is not active through any events nor media projects. Usually, the EU missions in the post-Soviet countries are not well-known to the public. However, a more visible promotion of EUAM could help promoting the reforms in the security sector in Ukraine [4].

While international politics has undergone some major changes over the last few years that directly impact European security, recent EU operations have been relatively modest, and with a few exceptions, member states have proved to be less inclined towards investing in CSDP missions in terms of providing personnel and financing. The EU figures show that between 2010 and 2014 the number of personnel seconded by the member states has dropped by 710 people. On the contrary, the civilian personnel contracted directly by the EU institutions increased by 117 individuals in the same period [7].

The EUAM mission had to face some difficulties in recruiting experts. The majority of the mission's personnel is provided by the member states. However, the EU does not have any general framework of regulating recruitment of civilian personnel. Thus, member states usually face difficulties when recruiting personnel at the required speed and of required expertise. In addition, it is even more problematic to find experts in the security sector [8].

The EUAM's personnel is also frequently criticised for its lack of experience with the post-Soviet area. Regardless of their high-quality expertise, it is not sufficient enough to successfully tackle law enforcement problems in Ukraine since they have no experience with Eastern Europe nor the Ukrainian realities. Therefore, the personnel is not able to use the political environment to promote necessary reforms. In many cases, Ukrainian officials preferred to consult with Brussels instead of the EUAM mission in Kiev. There have also been a few cases where Ukrainian officials had to wait for many months for mission expert to arrive in Kiev and advise them [6].

The EUAM is also restricted for budget constraints. In many operations, the CFSP budget proved insufficient to cover all the necessary needs of the civilian operations [7]. In addition, compared to other CSDP mission, EUAM is rather small. For example, the mission EULEX Kosovo has an annual budget of € 63 million [9] while EUAM has been provided with € 32 million for 18 months [10]. Also, EULEX has authorised maximum strength of 1268 personnel available, whereas the EUAM's number of personnel moves around 234 staff [8].

The scope of the mission in Ukraine was indirectly influenced by the geopolitics of the Eastern Europe. The mission was launched in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict following the 'Euromaidan' demonstrations back in 2013 and 2014. The conflict was partly triggered by Ukraine's decision to sign an Association Agreement with the EU,

which Russia was not in favour of. Therefore, the launch of EUAM was accompanied by a tense geopolitical environment [6].

Ukraine's original request was to send a mission to the Eastern regions of Ukraine. However, some member states were strongly against sending a mission to the East or were hesitant to send a mission at all. They perceived this action as too provocative towards Russia. Thus, their reluctant approach provided a difficult starting point to the negotiations. The member states' opinions were influenced by their policy priorities, which may have included a well-functioning relationship with Russia [3].

During the negotiation process, a series of opposing member states emerged. They were reluctant to launch a mission in Ukraine because of their decent bilateral relations with Russia. Meanwhile, other member states such as Poland urged the EU to define its interests towards Russia and to join the Ukrainian side through helping and encouraging Ukrainian authorities to guarantee the promotion of democracy, rule of law and stability in the region. Because of the lack of coherence on this issue between the member states, several states offered a political compromise, which would be acceptable for all member states. Sweden, Poland and Great Britain submitted a proposal on a mission aimed at the Ukrainian security sector reform according to which the mission in Ukraine would have been civilian, not military. Civilian missions are less controversial from a political and financial point of view at the member states' national level because they do not involve the use of an actual military force and they can be financed through the common EU budget with the exception of personnel, which is financed directly by the member states [7]. Another part of the proposal was that the mission would be advisory, not executive or monitoring as the Ukrainian officials initially requested. A final part of the compromise proposal was that the mission would have its headquarters in Kiev instead of regional presences in Eastern Ukraine [4].

The lack of coherence during the negotiations did not provide a solid ground for the launch and development of EUAM. Without coherence among the member states it is difficult for the mission to successfully push through reforms of its liking. In addition, Ukraine's disappointment with the scope of the mission does not help to reach the aim of the mission. Ukraine hoped that the EU would demonstrably take its side in relations with Russia. Thus, the geopolitics influenced the mandate of the mission, which brings us back to the inefficiency of EUAM on the ground.

As mentioned above, the mandate and the level of coordination of EUAM is considered to be quite narrow and limited. At the beginning of the negotiations, the mission seemed quite ambitious. However, the mandate was not able to provide the Ukrainian agencies material or technical support. In addition, the personnel of the mission was forced in many cases to decline an assistance because of its restricted mandate, which is only advisory, but not operational. Also, Ukrainian authorities would prefer a larger representation of experts with experience with dealing with post-Soviet law enforcement problems among the

EUAM's personnel. The number of personnel itself is quite small just like it is in the case of the available budget for EUAM. The mission's ambition was bigger at the beginning but it ultimately led to a disappointment on the Ukrainian side.

**Recommendations for improvement.** The key area that is in need for a change is **the mandate** of EUAM itself. The mandate in its current form is too restricted. In order to have an actual impact on the reform of the security sector in Ukraine, the mandate should have the capability to provide assistance. The mission should also be able to deliver technical equipment and trainings to Ukrainian civil servants.

Concerning the capacity of the mission, the EU should **rethink the EUAM's budget** so that it would be able to carry out its agenda without any financial obstructions. Furthermore, the mission might want to consider taking on personnel who is experienced in the security sector in the post-Soviet area. The personnel should also work outside of the main headquarters in Kiev, especially in the Eastern regions. Also, the mission office in Kiev needs to closely cooperate with the few regional presences in Ukraine that it has.

The EU should improve **public diplomacy** regarding the EUAM mission. The EU should advertise what has been done in the domestic transformation in Ukraine and what has been done to support stability and security in the region. A more visible approach of EUAM to the Ukrainian public might promote its importance and increase the possibility of implementing reforms successfully. The mission should be also more self-critical and should issue statements that might be negative.

The EUAM mission should enhance a **cooperation with other EU institutions** which operate on the Ukrainian ground (especially EU Delegation) in order to facilitate implementing the mission's agenda. EUAM should be also more realistic about what it can accomplish and deliver and be clear about its interests and visions, especially in cooperation with the Ukrainian partner.

**EUMM Georgia.** This chapter of the paper will discuss the ESDP European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in Georgia, by, first, going through its activities, objectives and accomplishments, secondly, the obstacles that hamper its productivity and third, come up with recommendations on what can be improved.

EUMM, established on October 1<sup>st</sup>, 2008, is one of the politically most sensitive ESDP missions. Since then the mission has contributed to the stabilisation of the situation and the diffusion of tensions along the Georgian borders and the de facto borders of Abkhazia and South Ossetia self-proclaimed independent regions. The technical issues, the constraints on the fulfilment of its mandate along with the role of Russia and EU-Russia relations complicate the implementation process. After the war in South Ossetia in August 2008, the reached cease-fire agreement ('the 6 point plan') with the mediation of the French president, envisaged the deployment of an international mechanism to monitor the ceasefire. EU Council committed itself to 'contribute actively to the effective implementation of these principles [...] including on the ground' [11]. Soon afterwards in

an extremely speedy manner the mission was established, marked by the great willingness of the member states to contribute to the mission, that currently numbers 200 observers from the EU. The mission aims to (1) *stabilise* the situation on the ground, (2) *normalise* civilian-societal affairs, (3) contribute to the *confidence-building*, (4) provide first-hand *information* to the EU for policy making. Aside from its main objectives, the mission also concentrates on the 'soft issues' such as civil governance with a focus on the rule of law, human rights and the humanitarian situation of the local population. The mission also cooperates with the Georgian government, having Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defence as its main interlocutor, in order to restrict the weapons and personnel allowed by the police and the armed forces near the Administrative Boundary Line (ABL) [12]. Even though EUMM was instrumental to facilitate the return of around 30.000 IDPs in the immediate aftermath of the conflict, another 30.000 South Ossetians remain displaced [13]. One of the biggest accomplishments of this cooperation is the establishment of the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) in February 2009, providing the framework for regular meetings of the sides and the international actors to discuss the security and day-to-day cases in the conflict zones. With its help situations of detentions, discuss daily issues created by the borderization, from divided farms, harvesting, lost cattle, irrigation issues to barb wire and demarcation sign installations. Another mechanism brought about by the EUMM, is the hot line, which has been constantly activated. Available 24/7, the hot line records and reports the information collected this way and helps to diffuse tensions and give early warnings by the frequent exchange of information and clarifications [14].

The obstacles faced by the mission can be divided into two groups – political and technical. Prior to the EU deployment in the region, the OSCE and UN had been present here, and had been perceived as relatively moderate and neutral actors and accepted by the breakaway regions. When these missions were terminated, due to the Russian veto [15], Georgia requested their substitution with an EU mission, (initially a military operation). This created the impression of imposing the pro-Western policy to Georgia, therefore favourable of Georgia and not neutral. Because of this, in addition to the Russian influence, the EUMM has not been allowed to enter and monitor inside Abkhazia and South Ossetia and has been constrained to operate along the ABL, since its deployment, even though its mandated 'throughout Georgia' [16]. Even though EU has provided considerable support to the regions, amounting to the biggest foreign donor [17] (but falling short to contest with the huge Russian financial flows), the EU and its missions are not welcomed here, also due to their stand of non-recognition of the breakaway regions. However, this refusal to cooperate also cuts any opportunity for the EU to prove the neutrality of the mission. This issue 'owes some credit' to the absence of the OSCE presence, which enjoying trust of the breakaway regions had been able to provide comprehensive monitoring assistance [18].

It is important to look at these micro level affairs from a Russia-EU macro level standpoint to get the whole grasp of underlying preconditions. Since the beginning of any interaction between the EU and independent Georgia, the EU policy was formed through the 'Russia-first' approach. The EU states have been reluctant in their Georgia policies to overstep into Russia's backyard or the so-called 'near abroad', where it has strategic interests. Different EU states at different times, who were favourable to Russia, opposed any politically sensitive involvement in Georgia. The cost-benefit calculations of such approach limited EU's capacity to get involved on high-politics level, falling short of Georgian demands and expectations. This not only practically limits the mission's mandate, but also causes difficulties in monitoring the incidents from one perspective only. Notwithstanding the declarative tone of non-recognition, the mission might contribute to the consolidation of the de-facto states by practically agreeing to deliver the mission according to their terms and by monitoring the ABL, legitimize it. This threatens to undermine the EU relations with Georgia. The recognition of Abkhazia's and South Ossetia's independence in the aftermath of the 2008 war by Russia, further erodes the possibility of a compromise. This policy contains the danger of disappointing the expectations of Georgians and undermine their pro-European aspirations, as the revolutionary shifts to the pro-Western directions was pushed by the public pressure.

Coming to the technical issues, one should mention the shortcomings of speedy planning, coordination and coherence between many EU actors present in Georgia and the issue of funding. Although the mission was deployed timely, it did not succeed to deliver it in a sophisticated and well-prepared manner causing logistical and technical problems [19]. As it deployed multiple teams with diverging tasks, the mission created coordinational problems. Urgent deployment also undermined the selection process of the staff, skipping the usual selection process. Because of the lack of interoperability and coherence between the contingents contributed by every member state, the initial phase of the mission required further reorganisation and was accompanied by a chaos in the beginning. Procurement complexities resulted in the lack of basic technical equipment, i.e. phones, computers etc. Furthermore, not all states kept up with their initial commitment [19].

As the EU is represented in Georgia by multiple actors – the Commission through Eastern Neighbourhood, the EUMM, the Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia – there has been an overlap of activities because of the lack of coordination.

In addition to the existing constrains, the EUMM credibility and the possibility to normalization was further damaged, when head of the Mission, Andrzej Tyszkiewicz, was declared persona non grata by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Abkhazia in a statement adding that 'EUMM under the leadership of Tyszkiewicz is clearly not disposed to carry out unbiased monitoring and to give an objective assessment to processes posing threat to security' [20].

**Recommendation for improvement.** As the denial of access to the breakaway regions is the biggest issue faced by the EUMM, thus the improvement should be concentrated in this direction. **To rebuild confidence** in a third party, as enjoyed by the OSCE, constructive measures should be taken. The mission, based on its gatherings can draft a proposal on an agreement to be discussed at multipartite Geneva International Discussions on acceptable and unacceptable military and civilian activities, along the ABL, specifically around the potentially sensible and hostile areas.

For this end, the EUMM should be more actively working through **public diplomacy** both in Georgia and in the secessionist entities. The EUMM does not enjoy as wide a recognition as did OSCE [18], therefore many of the accomplishments it achieves go by without much appreciation and publication. The better realization of what the EUMM does will give it more top-down legitimacy and thus make it a more important and credible actor in the settlement or management processes.

Another aspect that will make the work of the mission more fruitful is the general level of **relations between Georgia and Russia**. An improvement in the diplomatic dimension and the restoration of trade links to their fullest extent, will not only benefit the sides practically, but also will ease the tensions on the ground and provide a wider room for political manoeuvring for the EU (widening the mandate) and the mission (on day-to-day contacts).

The EUMM can establish **track-two links** with the representatives of the civil societies of the regions and offer internships, scholarships formally or work with them in a manner that would not be viewed as too politically sensitive to avoid a backlash. This way, it would be possible to create a favourable image of the mission and a bottom-up push for allowing it to monitor inside their entities.

Lastly, the most controversial one on this list of the recommendations – applying a position of **‘no position’** on the level of the mission regarding the status of the breakaway regions, while keeping its stand of ‘non-recognition on the EU level’ and the respect for Georgia’s territorial integrity. Simply put, to avoid any articulation of the mission’s position in relations with South Ossetia and Abkhazia, by simply putting it aside and working on the practical issues. This measure will necessitate a diplomatic language and articulation of the upmost delicacy.

**Conclusion.** Both the EUAM Ukraine and the EUMM Georgia share similarities in the restriction of their mandates and in the prime reason why they do so – Russia. In both cases some of the member states, worrying about their bilateral relations with Russia, wanted the EU to keep a low profile, so as not to overstep into the Russian backyard. This is a part of the EU’s larger problem to find a common single voice in external affairs when it comes to sensitive issues. As a result, the ambition plans end up buried in the lowest common denominator. To varying degrees, both missions faced operational administrative difficulties on the ground, though the EUMM seems to have overcome this after almost 10

years of its deployment, as opposed to the EUAM where there is the basic need of having experts on the specific issues, and little coordination with the other EU institutions present in the country. However, the EUMM Georgia faces probably more fundamental problem of not being welcome in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which renders much of its scope. For both missions better publicity and public affairs would be beneficial and give them more sense. Rethinking of the mandate and, in general any improvement of the relations with Russia of the involved actors will make the work of the missions more productive and let them fulfil the whole proposed scope of action.

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**ANALYSIS OF PROBLEMS WHICH CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS MUST FACE  
IN EASTERN PARTNERSHIP COUNTRIES**

**Key words:** EU missions, CSDP, EUAM Ukraine.

This paper analyses two European Union Common Security Defence policy missions in the post-soviet space – the Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform in Ukraine and the Monitoring Mission in Georgia. The aim of the research is to identify the obstacles the mission have faced beginning with the request of the host states, the decision making process in the EU up to the deployment and the current state. The paper also comes up with recommendations for their improvement.

Սուբիասյան Նարեկ, Կուչերովա Անետա

**ԱՐԵՎԵԼՅԱՆ ԳՈՐԾՆՆԿԵՐՈՒԹՅԱՆ ԵՐԿՐՆԵՐՈՒՄ ԱՆՎՏԱՆԳՈՒԹՅԱՆ ԵՎ  
ՊԱՇՏՊԱՆՈՒԹՅԱՆ ԸՆԴՀԱՆՈՒՐ ՔԱՂԱՔԱԿԱՆՈՒԹՅԱՆ  
ԱՌԱՔԵԼՈՒԹՅՈՒՆՆԵՐԻ ԵՎ ԳՈՐԾՈՂՈՒԹՅՈՒՆՆԵՐԻ ՃԱՆԱՊԱՐՀԻՆ  
ՀԱՅՏՆՎԱԾ ԽՆԴԻՐՆԵՐԻ ՎԵՐԼՈՒԾՈՒԹՅՈՒՆ**

**Քանալի բառեր՝** ԵՄ առաքելություններ, անվտանգության և պաշտպանության ընդհանուր քաղաքականություն, ԵՄ խորհրդատվական առաքելություն Ուկրաինայում:

Հոդվածը քննում է Եվրոպական միության անվտանգության և պաշտպանական ընդհանուր քաղաքականության երկու առաքելություններ հետխորհրդային տարածքում: Դրանք են՝ Քաղաքացիական անվտանգության ոլորտի բարեփոխման առաքելությունը Ուկրաինայում և Մոնիտորինգ առաքելությունը Վրաստանում: Ուսումնասիրության նպատակն է հայտնաբերել այն խոչընդոտները, որոնք հայտնվել են առաքելությունների ճանապարհին՝ սկսած հյուրընկալող պետությունների կողմից արված պահանջներից ու ԵՄ-ում դրանց վերաբերյալ որոշում կայացնելուց մինչև դրանց տեղակայումը ու ներկայիս վիճակը: Հոդվածում նաև առաջ են քաշվում դրանց բարելավմանն ուղղված առաջարկություններ:

Сукиасян Нарек, Кучерова Анета

## **АНАЛИЗ ПРОБЛЕМ, ВОЗНИКШИХ НА ПУТИ МИССИЙ И ОПЕРАЦИЙ ОБЩЕЙ ПОЛИТИКИ БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ И ОБОРОНЫ В СТРАНАХ ВОСТОЧНОГО ПАРТНЕРСТВА**

**Ключевые слова:** миссии ЕС, общая политика безопасности и обороны,  
Консультативная миссия ЕС в Украине.

Данная статья анализирует две задачи общей безопасности и официальной политики Евросоюза на постсоветской территории - задача реформ сферы социальной безопасности на Украине и задача мониторинга в Грузии. Цель исследования - прояснить те трудности, которые возникли на пути миссий, начиная с условий, которые были поставлены принимающим государством, и решений ЕС, связанных с этими условиями, заканчивая размещением и нынешним состоянием. В статье также выдвинуты предложения по реформам этих условий.